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Introduction
Making sense of our ever-changing surroundings requires the extraction of temporal information
from a continuous stream of stimulation. How do we achieve this when the relevant information
can be separated by only tens of milliseconds? I address this question by focusing on the debate
concerning the perceptual asynchrony of changes of visual features. This refers to the finding that
when a moving stimulus simultaneously changes its color and direction of movement, the subjects
report that the change in color occurs 60–100ms before the change in direction.
One explanation for this finding is that colors are processed faster than motion, which in turn
means that changes in color are processed faster than changes in motion, and this difference in
perceptual latency is reflected in our judgments of the temporal features of the stimuli (Moutoussis
and Zeki, 1997, 2002). Crucially, this explanation assumes that the judged order of events mirrors
the time at which the brain generates the representation of the events or their features. Because the
temporal properties of the representations generated by the brain serve as time-markers1, this view
has been called the brain time view.
Nishida and Johnston (2002, 2010) object to this explanation and propose the time-marker
view as an alternative. This view differs from the brain time view in two respects. First, it holds
that representations of color and motion are generated at the same time, and that the reported
asynchrony between them results from an error in a specialized mechanism responsible for
temporal judgments. Second, temporal judgments mirror the timing of external events as closely
as possible (rather than the time when the neural processing of the events is completed). For this
reason, the mechanism is thought to be a mid-level perceptual process.
In what follows, I will defend the brain time view from the objections raised against it by Nishida
and Johnston. This has been already done on the empirical grounds (e.g., Arnold, 2010;Moutoussis,
2012, 2014). My argumentation complements this debate by focusing on themore theoretical issues
and highlighting implicit assumptions in Nishida and Johnston’s argumentation.
The Inherent Problems of the Brain Time View
The first set of objections concerns a number of inherent problems that the brain time view allegedly
faces. To begin with, referring to Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992), Johnston and Nishida (2001,
R428) argue that the brain time view faces “some thorny philosophical problems.” Yet, not all
of them are particularly pressing. For example, Nishida and Johnston (2002) argue that the brain
time view comprises “a logical pitfall” because it equates the time when the event appears to occur
with the time when the brain generates the representation. Even though it is theoretically possible
that these two can be separated, it does not follow that they actually are. Thus, pointing out the
possibility is not a particularly effective objection.
Two inherent problems need to be addressed in more detail, however. First, Nishida and
Johnston (2010, 286) claim that the brain time view suffers the “logical shortcoming of identifying
1In its most general sense, a time-marker is something that a process can utilize during a task in which the temporal features
of stimuli or experiences of stimuli are determined.
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physical co-occurrence of the cortical representation of event A
and that of event B with the representation of co-occurrence
of events A and B.” Second, in relation to the brain time view,
they (Nishida and Johnston, 2002, 359) claim that “[i]n order
to judge the temporal order of two arbitrary neural events, the
brain must have a mechanism to compare them and anatomical
connections of high temporal fidelity between the neurons to
be compared. This meta-analysis of neural processing places
a high combinatorial burden on the brain.” These two claims
are inconsistent though. While the first holds that the co-
occurrence of two neural events is not separately represented,
the second argues that the temporal judgments are due to
some sort of comparison mechanism. The second claim is a
more plausible option and concurs with, say, Efron’s (1963)
idea of simultaneity center according to which the temporal
order of stimuli is determined on the basis of the relative
arrival times of sensory signals to this hypothetical simultaneity
center. Thus, the objection based on a logical shortcoming is
misdirected.
As for the claim concerning a burden on the brain, it too is
misdirected as it assumes that the purpose of the brain time view
is to deduce the actual time of external events from the time of
neural activity—this is the reason why the temporal comparator
supposedly needs to account for the temporal features of different
anatomical connections. However, such an assumption is not
subscribed to by proponents of the brain time view, nor is it
part of the brain time view as Nishida and Johnston themselves
describe it! On the contrary, the brain time view holds that
timing mirrors when the representations of events are generated.
(Mirroring not mean that timing needs to match exactly with the
time when the representations of events are generated.) Thus,
the mechanism needs to compare only the temporal properties
of neural signals—just as Efron’s simultaneity center does—and,
since this task is necessitated by the time-marker view as well, the
burden on the brain is the same in this respect.
It is worth highlighting another commonality between these
two views: in both theories, time-marker is a temporal property
of neural activity brought about by an external event that some
timing mechanism makes use of 2. For example, in the time-
marker view, such a mechanism makes use of “the temporal
pattern of the neural activity elicited by [external] events.”
(Nishida and Johnston, 2002, 366) Thus, the difference here is
that in the time-marker view the time-marker is based on an
unconscious, mid-level perceptual neural activity, whereas in the
2This assumes that the outcome of the mid-level mechanism responsible for
temporal judgments in the time-marker view is something that we become
conscious of, rather than something that is utilized by some subsequent timing
mechanism. Theories that make use of this kind notion of time-markers often
concern simultaneity perception and reaction time studies (e.g., Efron, 1963;
Jas´kowski, 1996; Jas´kowski et al., 2014; Yarrow and Arnold, 2015). This notion
can be contrasted with a symbolic notion that is often attributed to Dennett and
Kinsbourne (1992). They illustrated it using date stamps on letters—a stamp (time-
marker) represents the date when a letter is sent regardless of when the stamp is
interpreted (when the letter arrives). This notion is rarely explicitly endorsed—
something along these lines has been presented in relation to the postdiction effects
(e.g., Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000, 2007; Grush, 2005, 2006)—and even more
rarely explicated. Thus, the notion remains under-described, both theoretically and
in neural terms (e.g., Arnold, 2010; Arstila, 2015).
brain time view the neural activity relates to the representation of
the event, and the temporal mechanism comes into play later in
the processing hierarchy.
The Brain Time View and Inconsistent
Latency Estimations
The second objection against the brain time view is based on
inconsistencies in perceptual latency estimations obtained using
the reaction time method and temporal judgment tasks3. Nishida
and Johnston (2002, 362) claim that the inconsistent results are
problematic for the brain time view because, in the context of
the perceptual asynchrony debate, “it is difficult to understand
why [the asynchrony measured with temporal judgments] is not
reflected in reaction time.”
The described inconsistency assumes, however, that an
external event produces only one time-marker and that
assumption has been rejected in two equally reasonable
ways. Sternberg and Knoll’s different time-marker hypothesis
(1973) rejects the assumption by maintaining that the two
tasks have different task demands: temporal order judgments
maximize correct judgments, whereas reaction time tasks
emphasize speed (Sternberg and Knoll, 1973). Miller and
Schwarz (2006, 394) likewise maintain that these two tasks
have “fundamentally different task demands.” Thus, the tasks
use different features of a single internal response as time-
markers4 and subsequently produce different results based on
the same response. This concurs with the previous notion of
time-markers because the constitution of a time-marker depends
on the timing mechanisms and, hence, one internal response
can manifest as different time-markers if different timing
mechanisms make use of different temporal properties of the
response.
Another way to reject the assumption is to argue that an
external event causes two different internal responses, both of
which serve as time-markers (Tappe et al., 1994; Aschersleben
and Müsseler, 1999). One response is utilized by temporal
order judgments and occurs in the later stage of processing.
Early on, the processing leading to this response is separated
from the processing which feeds into the motor system and is
used in the reaction time tasks. Because, there are two timing
mechanisms that use different internal responses as the basis
for time-markers, the two mechanisms can provide inconsistent
results. In both alternatives, temporal judgments make use of
temporal properties of neural states, which can be representations
of events, and thus the brain time view can account for the
inconsistency.
3For example, reaction time measurements and temporal order judgments are
affected differently by changes in stimulus intensity and its luminance profile
(Roufs, 1974; Jas´kowski, 1996), stimulus modality (Rutschmann and Link, 1964;
Jas´kowski et al., 1990), spatial frequency of visual gratings (Tappe et al., 1994), and
stimulus motion (Aschersleben and Müsseler, 1999).
4According to Sternberg and Knoll, TOJ tasks use the time of the activation peak
of the response and RT tasks use the time when the activation crosses some earlier
threshold. Miller and Schwarz, in turn, argue that the criterion in RT tasks is higher
than in TOJ tasks, and thus that the RT tasks employ the later part of the internal
response than TOJ tasks.
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Latencies of Different Types of Changes
Finally, Nishida and Johnston (2002, 2010) make a distinction
between first-order and second-order changes. The first-order
changes, called transitions, require that two points in time be
compared (e.g., color at t1 and t2). Second-order changes, called
turning points, require the comparing of three points in time
(e.g., spatial position at t1, t2, and t3). A special mechanism
is thought to exist only for temporal judgments related to
transitions and thus determining the time of turning points
takes longer. Consequently, even if a transition and a turning
point were to occur simultaneously, the latter would be judged
to occur later than the former. Nishida and Johnston’s results
as regards synchrony between different transitions and turning
points support this claim.
Assuming that these experiments are comparable to those
concerning the original finding, the obtained results conflict
with the claim that colors are processed faster than motion.
However, they are not in conflict with the brain time view in
general. This is because the results do not specify the processing
stage at which the time-markers for the turning points are
established. Hence, they are also compatible with the claim
that the mechanism responsible for temporal judgments in the
brain time view requires more time to determine turning points
than to determine transitions. In this way, the brain time view
can explain Nishida and Johnston’s finding in largely the same
fashion as the time-marker view.
Summary
The brain time view and the time-marker view can be understood
to rely upon the existence of a temporal judgment comparator
that makes use of the temporal properties of neural activity
caused by an external event. The main difference in these two
views concerns the processing stage in which such comparison
takes place and what the timing concerns about. The objections
raised by Nishida and Johnston against the brain time view
cannot settle the question of which theory is closer to the
truth. However, Nishida and Johnston (2010, 286) are correct
in their claim that the brain time view “assumes that a brain
time mechanism is poorly designed in the sense that processing
delay is added to event time estimation.” Then again, given the
evidence that cortical processing influences temporal judgments
(Arnold and Wilcock, 2007), and that Efron (1963) postulated
his simultaneity center exactly because it could account for the
processing delays between cortical hemispheres, the existence of
such a poor mechanism could be closer to the truth than the
mechanism postulated by the time-marker view.
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